War, peace, and the mafia

Organized crime is a largely underestimated factor in prolonging and even perpetuating civil conflicts. The case of the Yugoslav wars illustrates this with dramatic clarity.

Organized crime is an important factor to take into account when studying separatist movements, for the success of the movement as well as for the level of escalation reached in the separation process, especially through the position it occupies in war economies. Considering the case of Yugoslavia, its impact on the wars’ outbreak, duration, outcome, and aftermath is of immense proportions and has often been understated. 

Rational economic considerations can have a great impact in prolonging civil wars; creating “an alternative system of profit, power, and even protection” (David Keen) that is based on corruption and institutionalized violence against civilians may result in a situation where the continuation of war appears more attractive than peace for a considerable part of the population; especially for individuals in positions of power within the war economy system, which can be a source of massive profits, not only for organized crime groups.

The so-called multi-ethnic Yugo-mafia “was a critical factor in the conflict, trumping nationalist agendas left and right” according to scholar Danilo Mandic. With establishment of the first UN arms embargo on Yugoslavia in September 1991, the combatting groups were forced to either acquire weapons illegally or produce them themselves. As a consequence, the Serbs, in whose territories most of the Yugoslav weapons industries were situated and who had taken control over most of the Yugoslav People’s Army equipment, held a significant advantage – at least in theory. Considering the amount of small arms and light weapons traded by the mafia, it is no surprise that the embargo had no discernible effect. Furthermore, the Yugo mafia occupied a crucial role both in procuring weapons and keeping alive the war. When it came to making money, considerations of ethnic sympathies were of very little matter. All combatting groups traded with each other, creating a complex underground network with considerable possibilities to gain wealth and power – the most impressing example being without a doubt Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian smuggler who actually founded a state, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which survived for almost two years. A member of the UN stated that the course of the war was determined by “gunslingers, thugs, and essentially criminals”.

The line Charles Tilly draws between the state and the mafia – their legitimacy, the “probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority“– is rarely as blurry as in our case, especially as we consider the above-mentioned self-made state-maker and statesman Abdic, who managed to cooperate with a UN peacekeeping battalion, creating a black market monopoly which permitted him to become only provider of food and other vital goods into the province. 

Soon after the outbreak of the war toward the end of the year 1991, the Yugoslav army, which was under Serb command, encountered problems recruiting enough personnel, leading to the formation of so-called gangster units, piloted mainly by criminals engaging in organized crime. Croatian forces soon employed the same strategy. Despite the fact that this measure doubtlessly increased the armies’ manpower, it had the deciding disadvantage of reducing military effectiveness by a great deal: The members of the gangster units were deeply rooted in rhizomatic organized crime structures and happily traded small arms and light weapons and other goods with enemy forces. If estimates assume that at the beginning, Serbian gangster units consisted of eighty percent “common criminals” and twenty per cent “fanatics”, the greater part of the latter soon abandoned nationalist ideals as they realized the immense business opportunities war offered.

An unbelievable thirty percent of equipment provided by the international community to support the Bosnian Muslim forces somehow made its way to Croatian forces in the course of the conflict. A Serb munitions factory supplied Croat and Bosnian forces likewise with munition – more than ninety-for tons of material in total. What is more, evidence suggests that all three sides cooperated in order to produce tanks and ammunition: Both the M-84 tank and the 7.62 rifle bullet required materiel manufactured at multiple sites which were situated in territories controlled by different armies. The production of the bullet in Bosnia-Herzegovina involved factories controlled by Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Croats, forming an absurd but profitable business cooperation network.

Materiel was not the only thing the combatting groups exchanged for money. In a phone call intercepted by UN forces, a Bosnian Muslim Commander and a Bosnian Serb Commander were caught negotiating a price in deutschmark for the Serbs to attack Croat forces. In 1993, paramilitary forces charged with the defence of Mount Igman, situated before the gates of Sarajevo, were willing to give up their positions in exchange for the control of black-market routes.

Sieges demonstrate most aptly how, if there was a possibility to trade, existing networks quickly spread, thus enlarging the number of profiteers and rendering the termination of the hostilities all the more difficult. The best example for how organized crime activities contributed to prolonging conflict is probably the siege of Sarajevo, lasting 1425 (!) days despite the embargo, as the Bosniak forces managed to cooperate with local gangsters in order to acquire arms and ammunition. The police chief of Sarajevo accused a tri-ethnic mafia of deliberately prolonging the siege, generating massive profits. Another spectacular underground network was constructed around the Bosnian Fifth Corpus, which somehow managed to survive for three full years from 1992 to 1995, despite being ‘completely encircled’ by two Serbian armies during the entire period. Thanks to the Yugo mafia, the Corpus was provided with food, clothing, fuel, weapons and ammunition. Estimates assume that tens of millions of deutsche marks were exchanged every month, with Serbian soldiers being the main profiteers, selling their enemies war equipment. As Chingono observed, in a war economy system, members of international agencies also tend to participate in illicit activities, in the case of the Bosnian Fifth Corpus network, it was the UN Protections Force who enriched itself.

The example of Yugoslavia is a powerful demonstration of the importance of taking into account personal interest and social structures when analysing armed conflict. What is more, the presence of a highly profitable war economy constitutes a major obstacle for constructing positive peace, illustrating the often neglected nexus of peacebuilding studies and economics and the need for further research.

Ella Semrad

Informations

Auteur.e.s : SEMRAD Ella

Année d’écriture : 2025

Contexte d’écriture : billet de blog

Langue d’écriture : Anglais

Les sources de cet article peuvent être fournis sur demande à l’adresse mail suivante : negopolisnei@gmail.com


OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
NegoPolis (17 janvier 2025). War, peace, and the mafia. Études des Relations Internationales et du Global (ERIG). Consulté le 17 mai 2025 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/133t8


Laisser un commentaire

Votre adresse e-mail ne sera pas publiée. Les champs obligatoires sont indiqués avec *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.